Hace cosa de dos meses ya se abrió un hilo con este mismo tema, incluyendo las mismas exageraciones. Repasemos a un historiador de los serios, especialista del Frente del Este, el coronel estadounidense Glantz.
Operation Star Polar
The Northwestern Front, now commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, was to play the major role in Polar Star by destroying the German II Army Corps at Demiansk and advancing through Staraia Russa and Dno to Pskov and Narva. The Northwestern Front's left wing, consisting of the Twenty-Seventh, Eleventh, Thirty-Fourth, First Shock and Fifty-Third Armies, was to make Timoshenko's main attack through Staraia Russa towards Luga and Dno and destroy German forces at Demiansk. Subsequently, a Special Operational Group made up of the First Tank and Sixty-Eighth Armies under Colonel-General M. S. Khozin's command, was to advance norhwest, capture Skov and Narva, and cut off and destroy the German Eighteenth Army in cooperation with the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts (61). The Northwestern Front was to begin its offensive on 15 February.
In the Leningrad region, the Leningrad Front's Fifty-Fifth Army was to attack southeastwards towards Tosno, wheel eastwards across to Tosno River, and link up with the Volkhov Front's Fifty-Fourth Army, advancing on Tosno from the northeast. The twin pincers would encircle all German forces in the Mga-Siniavino region, widen the narrow corridor to Leningrad, and, subsequently, serve a hammer to smash the bulk of Army Group North against an anvil formed by the Northwestern Front advancing in the south (62). While the Fifty-Fifth and Fifty-Fourth Armies were conducting their pincer manoeuvre towards Tosno, the Leningrad Front's Sixty-Seventh and Volkhov Front's Second Shock Armies were to attack Gorodok Nos 1 and 2 and Siniavino and capture Mga and the Leningrad-Volkhov railroad.
Before the operation began, the Stavka transferred the Second Shock Army and its sector north of Siniavino to the Volkhov Front to provide for a more unified command and control structure. The Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts were to begin their offensive on 8 February, one week before the Northwestern Front, to draw Army Group North's reserves northwards to Leningrad and away from the Northwertern Front's main attack sector. The fact that the Stavka assigned Zhukov, Timoshenko, Katukov and Tolbukhin to plan or participate in Operation Polar Star was indicat¡ve of the importance the Stavka attached to the offensive.
Major-General V. P. Sviridov's Fifty-Fifth Army, which formed the Leningrad Front's arm of the pincer, consisted of eight rifle divisions, two rifle and two ski brigades, and one tank regiment (63). Sviridov planned to lead the assault with three rifle divisions and one ski brigade in the first echelon supported by a tank regiment, a force numbering 33.000 men and 30 tanks (64). Once his first echelon smashed German defenses at Krasny Bor, a mobile group consisting of a ski and tank brigades was to advance along the Oktiabr railroad, capture Ul'ianovka Station, and lead the advance on Tosno (65). Sviridov's forces faced L Army Corps' 250th "Spanish Blue" Infantry Division and the 4th SS Police Division deployed in the 32 km- (20-miles-) wide sector from Krasny Bor to the Neva River east of Kolpino. General Esteban-Infantes' Spanish division had a reinforced regiment and three infantry battalions -4500 men but no tanks- facing the Fifty-Fifth Army's main attack.
Depleted Armies
The Volkhov Front's arm of the pincer, Major-General A. V. Sukhomlin's Fifty-Fourth Army, consisted of 10 rifle divisions, three rifle brigades and two tank brigades with a strength of more than 70.000 men and 60 tanks (66). Sukhomlin's forces were to assault a sector defended by XXVIII Army Corps' 96th Infantry Division, which was flanked on the left by the 69th Infantry Division and on the right by the 132th Infantry Division. General Noeldechen's 96th Infantry Division had been assigned this "quiet" sector after being decimated in the earlier fighting at Saniavino.
Although imposing in paper, the Sixty-Seventh and Second Shock Armies designated to attack at Gorodok Nos. 1 and 2 and at Saniavino, were still woefully understrength after the January fighting. Romanovsky's Second Shock Army consisted of 12 understrength rifle divisions, one rifle, one ski and two tank brigades, one tank regiment and four separate tank battalions -roughly 60.000 men and 50 tanks. Dukhanov's Sixty-Seventh Army consisted of six rifle divisions, eight rifle, two ski and four tank brigades, two tank regiments, two separate tank battalions, and one fortified region -about 40.000 men and 30 tanks in all (67). The German XXVI Army Corps (Group Hilpert) defended the Gorodok Nos. 1 and 2 salient with the 28th Jäger and 21th Infantry Division and the Saniavino region with the 11th and 61st Infantry Divisions, giving a combined strength of rougly 35.000 men.
Sviridov's Fifty-Fifth Army attacked early on 10 February after a two-hour artillery preparation. Catching the defenders by surprise, the 63rd Guards Rifle Division captured Krasny Bor at 12:00 hours, and the 45th Guards Rifle Division captured Mishkino later in the day. Satisfied by the 5 km (3.1 miles) advance, Sviridov ten committed his mobile group into action to exploit the 45th Guards Rifle Division's success. However, heavy resistance and unexpected thaw, which prevented the ski brigades from operating off the road, halted the mobile group attack short of its objective. Sviridov's tanks and infrantry got bogged down in hand-to-hand fighting with Spanish defenders along the Izhora River and the narrow roads south of Krasny Bor. During the later stages of the operation, the Germans reinforced the Spaniards' defences with regimental combat groups from the 212th and 215th Infantry Divisions transferred from Chudovo and Uritsk.
The forces on Sviridov's left flank fared little better. The 43rd Rifle Division and 34th Ski Brigade advance 4 km (2.5 miles) in two days of heavy fighting, driving the SS Police Division's forces back towards the Tosno River. Once again, however, the Germans quickly reinforced their defences and stopped the Soviet advance far short of his objectives (68). Sviridov's forces had advanced 5 km (3.1 miles) on a front of 14 km (8,7 miles) by 13 February, but could advance no more since his army had lost and estimated 10.000 casualties and most of his tanks in the heavy fighting. The Spanish 250th Infantry Division's gallant defence cost in 3200 casualties (69).
While Sviridov's forces were conducting their futile offensive at Krasny Bor, the Fifty-Fourth Army went into action early on 10 February in the sector north of Smerdynia and the Tigoda River, aiming its thrust at the railroad line south of Tosno. Sukhomlin ultimately attacked the 96th Infantry Defences with four rifle divisions, three rifle brigades and one tank brigade (70). Despite employing this overwhelming force, in three days of heavy fighting his shock group penetrated only 4 km (2.5 miles) into the German defence along a front of some 5 km (3,1 miles). The German halted the assault by reinforcing the 96th Infantry Division with regimental combat groups drawns from the 61st Infantry Division at Siniavino, the 121st Infantry and 217th Infantry Divisions, transferred from the Volkhov River Front, and from the adjacent 132nd Infantry Division.
The Sixty-Seventh and Second Shock Armies joined the offensive early on 12 February, capitalizing on the fact that the Eighteenth Army had transferred forces from the Siniavino region to reinforce the sectors already under assault. Dukhanov's shock group assaulted German defences at Gorodok Nos. 1 and 2 at the same time as Romanovsky's shock group struck German defences east and west of Siniavino. In six days of heavy fighting, Dukhanov's forces managed to capture Gorodok Nos 1 and 2 and advanced several kilometers southwards to the outskirts of Arbuzovo. Although they pinched off the small German salient pointing menacingly towards Shlissel'burg, the forces were too exhausted to accomplish more. To the east, however, Romanovsky's assault on Siniavino faltered immediately with heavy losses. The Soviet fourth Siniavino offensive ended with the Siniavino strongpoint still firmly in German hands.
The Leningrad and Volkhov Front's Tosno offensive failed for a variety of too familiar reasons (71). In a directive the Stavka issued the 27 February, it noted: "The basic shortcoming was the fact that the Sixty-Seventh and Second Shock Army operated separately... They dispersed their forces... and suffered injustifiable casualties." In reality, Govorov's and Meretskov's forces were to exhausted by previous fithting that they lacked the strenght and endurance necessary to fulfil the Stavka's overly ambitious missions.
Despite the obvious failure of the secondary attack to the north, Zhukov decide to capitalize on their diversionary effect and unleash the Northwestern Front's main attack. Meanwhile Timoshenko's armies were completing their final offensive preparation. However, deteriorating weather prevented his armies from concentrating in time, forcing Zhukov to delay the operation. No sooner had he authorized the delay than Soviet intelligence detected German preparations to abandon the Demiansk salient. Therefore, Zhukov ordered Timoshenko to begin his offensive prematurely with the forces he had at hand. The offensive thus developed in piecemeal fashion, with predictible results.
The Eleventh and Fifty-Third Armies assaulted the flanks of the Ramushevo corridor on 15 February, while the Thrity-Fourth began a series of harassing attacks on German positions northeast of Demiansk. When the initial assault failed, on 23 February Zhukov threw the Twenty-Seventh and First Shock Armies in combat, the former just south of Staraia Russa and the latter at the base of the corridor. However, both armies' attack faltered against the strong defences German forces had erected to protect their withdrawal from the Demiansk salient (72). Urged on by Zhukov, the two armies tried to resume their offensives on 27 February but once again failed with heavy losses. Upset over the heavy casualties and limited gains, Stalin halted the attacks on 27 February and ordered Zhukov to orchestrate a new offensive in March. The defeat cost Zhukov's and Timoshenko's forces 33.663 casualties, including 10.016 dead, captured or missing.
Neither Zhukov nor the Stavka, however, were ready to abandon the offensive entirely. On Zhukov's recommendation, the Stavka ordered the Northwestern, Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts to conduct a truncated version of Operation Polar Star against the same objectives as in the original operation (73). This time, the offensive was to begin in staggered fashion with the Northwestern Front attacking on 4 March and the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts on 14 March. Zhukov subordinated the Thirty-Fourth, Fifty-Third, Sixty-Eighth Armies and First Tank Army under Khozin's control, and ordered the Twenty-Seventh and First Shock Armies to capture Staraia Russa. If the latter two armies captured the town, Khozin's entire force was to exploit towards Pskov and Narva. The Stavka ordered the Leningrad and Voljov Fronts to conduct a supporting attack in the Leningrad region, this time a shallower envelopment of German forces located north of Mga without a frontal assault on Siniavino itself (74).
(61) Special Group Khozin, whose forces and commanders were hanpicked by the Stavka, consisted of Leutenant-General E. Katukov's newly formed First Tank Army and Leutenant-General F. I. Tolbukhin's new Sixty-Eighth Army.
(62) In addition, part of the Fifty-Fouth Army was to attack Liuban to both distract the Eighteen Army and tie down its forces.
(63) The Fifty-Fifth Army consisted on the 45th and 63th Guards, 43rd, 46th, 56th, 72nd, 131st and 268th Rifle Divisions, the 56th and 250th Rifle, 34th and 35th Ski, and the 222nd Tank Brigades, and the 31st Tank Regiment.
(64) Sviridov deployed the 45th and 63th Guards and 43rd Rifle Divisions, 34th Ski Brigade, and 31st Tank Regiment in first echelon.
(65) The mobile group, commanded by Major-General I. M. Liuboitsev, consisted of the 35th Ski and 222 Tank Brigades.
(66) The Fifty-Fourth Army comprised the 115th, 166th, 177th, 198th, 281st, 285th, 294th, 311th, 374th and 378th Rifle Divisions, the 14th and 140th Rifle Brigades, the 6th Naval Rifle Brigade, and the 122nd and 124th Tank Brigades.
(67) On 1 February 1943 the Second Shock Army comprised the 64th Guards, 11th, 18th, 71st, 128th, 147th, 314th, 364th, 367th and 379th Rifle Divisions, the 72nd Rifle and 73th Naval Rifle, and 16th and 98th Tank Brigades, the 32nd Guards Tank Regiment, and the 501st, 503th and 507th Separate Tank Battalions. The Sixty-Seventh Army comprised the 13th, 46th, 90th, 142nd, 189th and 224th Rifle Divisions, the 11th, 55th, 56th, 102nd, 123rd, 138th, 142nd and 250th Rifle and 1st, 61st, 152nd and 220th Tank Brigades, the 31st and 46th Guards Tank Regiments, the 86th and Separate Tank Battalions, an the 16th Fortified Region.
(68) Reinforcement included the 24th Infantry Division, portions of the 2sd SS Motorized Infantry Brigade, the Flanders Legion, and remants of the 11th, 21st and 227th Divisions, which had been severally damaged in the fighting of Siniavino.
(69) The 250th Division's Fusiliers Battalion lost almost 90 percent of its strength.
(70) The 166th, 198th, 311th and 378th Rifle Divisions, the 14th and 140th Rifle Brigades, the 6th Naval Rifle Brigade, and the 124th Tank Brigade.
(71) Soviet critiques credited the defeat to the strongly fortified enemy defences, faulty reconnaissance, poor Soviet command and control at all levels of command, clumsy employment of tanks (which invariably became separated from the infantry), and ineffective artillery support.
(72) The beginning of the German withdrawal from Demiansk salient, codenamed Operation Tsitin, begon on 19 February and totally disrupted Zhukov's plans for Operation Polar Star.
(73) By this time German forces had abandoned most of the Demiansk salient.
(74) The Stavka's decision was based on intelligence information that the German Eighteenth Army was concentrating strong forces near Siniavino, with the intention of conducting both a flank attack against the Fifty-Fifth Army from positions at Pushkin and against the Sixty-Seventh and Second Shock Army to restore the blockage.
in David M. Glantz:
The Siege of Leningrad 1941-1944. 900 Days of Terror, pp. 139-143.
Al grano:
1º Ni por asomo la 250ª Division Española de la Wehrmatch se enfrentó ella sola al 55º Ejército Rojo. A su lado estaba la 4ª SS Polizei División. Y, mira tú por dónde, si uno tiene la curiosidad de ir más allá de lo que aparenta ese nombre (unos pocos gendarmes especializados en dirigir el tráfico, ¿verdad?), resultar que se trataba de una SS PanzerGrenadiereDivisión en toda regla y que llevaba el rimbombante nombre de "policía" para recordarnos que se había cubierto de gloria custodiando campos de concentración.
Echemos un vistazo a este enlace:
http://www.feldgrau.com/4ss.html
Es decir, una división estándar de la Wehrmatch con sus tres regimientos de infantería y el de artillería, además de los cuatro o cinco batallones de rigor (exploradores, contracarro, ingenieros, etc...).
Por lo tanto, el frente de ataque de 32 kms estaba protegido por dos unidades de la Wehrmatch (250ª y 4ª SS Divisones) y no sólo por la 250ª.
2º Glantz afirma que no eran 3 regimientos españoles, sino un único regimiento reforzado con tres batallones. Tres regimientos constituían precisamente las tropas de infantería completas de una división, o sea, casi 10.000 hombres. 4.500 hombres se aproxima mucho más a lo que en realidad suponían esa cantidad de tropas; desde luego, no llegaban a dos regimientos.
3º Los 4.500 españoles sumados a los nominales 13.000 de la 4ª División SS (en realidad, debían ser menos porque habían combatido muy duro en enero) da una fuerza teórica de 17.500 hombres, que, en realidad, posiblemente no llegasen a 15.000. En todo caso, un ataque de 33.000 hombres contra 15.000 (relación de poco más de 2 contra 1) es insuficiente para que un ataque tenga éxito por poco fortificada que esté la posición (en el caso que nos ocupa bosques y marismas). Según los cánones, la relación debe ser como mínimo de 3 atacantes por 1 defensor para que existan garantías de éxito en el ataque y poder soportar el posterior y previsible contraataque.
4º Del texto de Glantz se deduce que el ataque los cogió dormidos, dado que a mediodía del primer día de ataque Karny Bor había caído en poder de los soviéticos. Sólo después llegó la reacción hispano-alemana (y no sólo española), no sin enviar a toda prisa otras unidades alemanas para reforzar el sector. Y habrá que preguntarse por qué tuvieron que enviar todos esos refuerzos.. ¿verdad? a la 250ª división y la 4ª Division SS.
5º El 55º Ejército Rojo tuvo 10.000 bajas. La 250ª divisón 3.200. ¿Y la 4 SS Divisón cuántas tuvo? No tengo las cifras, pero sí sé que, en marzo del 43, fue retirada del frente diezmada. En mayo estaba en Bohemia-Moravia figurando como simple "grupo de combate", es decir, que no estaría a más del 25% de su fuerza nominal.
Conclusión: los hechos ocurridos en Krasny Bor del 10 al 13 de febrero de 1943 no constituyen una batalla, sino un combate dentro de una operación mucho mayor: Operación Estrella Polar.
¿Resultados tácticos? Los soviéticos consumaron la ruptura del bloqueo terrestre de Leningrado efectuado un mes antes, en enero, aunque no lograban poner fin al asedio (la ciudad siguió bajo el fuego de la artillería hasta el año siguiente). Los supuestos atacantes (los alemanes y sus aliados) se habían convertido en los defensores (¿de qué?) y, en cambio, los asediados se habían adueñado de la iniciativa. ¡Y todavía algunos hablan de derrota "táctica" soviética! Aparentemente el Ejército Rojo no había conseguido nada, pero apartemos las apariencias: por esas mismas fechas, se estaban rindiendo en Stalingrado los restos del 6º Ejército de Paulus. Al mismo tiempo que se disolvía la Blau, se disolvían todos los ejércitos aliados de Hitler: italianos, húngaros y rumanos. ¿Es una coincidencia que las tropas del Ejército Rojo buscasen la confrontación con las tropas de los aliados de Hitler en una misma fecha? En cualquier caso, no comparto la visión de Glantz sobre Estrella Polar, por mucho que simbolizase Leningrado. El plato fuerte de la guerra en el Frente Oriental no se estaba librando en Leningrado en febrero de 1943, sino mucho más al sur, en Rostov, en Jarkov y en Kursk, donde se estaba desarrollando la Operación Marte.
¿Y a nivel estratégico? Pues a este nivel, el Ejército Rojo había obtenido una victoria sin paliativos. El Grupo de Ejércitos Norte se había quedado sin reservas y quedaba para siempre fuera de su alcance poder conquistar Leningrado. ¿No habían ido hasta allí para eso? Y, para colmo de males, a duras penas mantenían sus posiciones, como acabamos de ver. Del millón de hombres que tenía en enero de 1943 no disponía de más de 750.000 en julio, en el momento de librarse la última batalla decisiva (Kursk). En octubre tan sólo eran 650.000. La suerte estaba echada: sólo era cuestión de tiempo. En 1944 llegó el mazazo definitivo para el Grupo de Ejércitos Norte.
Y ahora vamos con la "efeméride":
¿Y a qué fueron allí esos chicos de la "Blau" que tanto festejas, Walther? Pues, en el mejor de los casos, a nada. Como dicen los rusos de todos los que les han invadido a lo largo de su historia... "vienen a bailar en el hielo, porque no les hemos invitado a ninguna fiesta".
Sin embargo, cuando uno piensa al servicio de quién pusieron esos españoles su arrojo y heroísmo, y cuando uno piensa en el millón de civiles muertos en Leningrado gracias a todos esos invasores, alemanes y no alemanes, hasta da cierta vergüenza ser español. Porque si a tí se te olvida que sirvieron a Hitler, a mí no se me olvidará jamás. Y el hecho de haber servido a semejante cerdo con apariencia humana no es precisamente digno de admiración.
Menos mal que otros españoles, con no menos arrojo y heroismo, sirvieron otra causa infinitamente más loable en aquella terrible guerra. Los de la "Nueve" por ejemplo, participaron en los combates de Libia, la liberación de París y hasta alcanzaron Bertchtesgaden. También hubo algún español que luchó en Stalingrado contra los alemanes y miles de ellos, en la Resistencia. Esos, también son españoles... ¡ESPAÑOLES con dos cojones, Walther! como tú mismo dices, pero de los que nadie quiere acordarse.
Y, por último, miles de españoles fueron tratados como animales por esos mismos alemanes por los que luchó la Blau, construyendo los U-Bunker de Burdeos, Lorient, Brest, La Rochela y St. Nazaire (incluido un familiar mío, resistente, prisionero forzado en Betasom, evadido, y maquis hasta la Liberación de Francia). Y fueron casi 5.000 Españoles los que perecieron en el campo de exterminio de Mauthausen, masacrados también por los esbirros de Hitler.
Y de verdad que siento tener que decirte todo esto, Walther. Pero si quieres rendir un homenaje al heroísmo del soldado español, entonces busca otras efemérides -hay cientos de ellas en nuestra dilatada historia-, en las que soldados españoles lucharon como héroes y dieron su vida por España.
¡Y no por la Alemania nazi!
Un saludo.
) "Estrella Polar " fue un fracaso antológico, aunque no es menos cierto que los soviéticos acabaron con el sueño alemán de tomar Leningrado, pero a a un coste humano insoportable para otro país que no fuera la U.R.S.S.
, si es que uno quiere ser coherente: Que c... hacen los prosoviéticos en un foro de Deutsche U-Boote, enemigos acérrimos de los ya citados 
¿Por qué no fundar un foro de submarinos rusos que le den caña a los alemanes? ....Y así todos felices...y comieron perdices. 
y 
